launched a humanitarian assistance programme. The programme was aimed at maintaining public health in the war-affected areas with 4 million refugees and displaced persons, over 200,000 dead, at least twice as many wounded, over 60,000 patients in need of rehabilitation and at least 1 million persons with deep psychological scars. The programme had 4 objectives: public health Interventions (Induding health and nutrition monitoring), physical and psychosodal rehabilitation, distribution of medical supplies and health care reform. A key feature was a systematic assessment of the needs of the affected population by means of health and nutrition monitoring which helped to target the assistance. For some areas the WHO'S medical supplies were the only source of much needed drugs. With the health authorities WHO initiated a health care reform, to enable the qualitatively reasonably good but top-heavy and expensive health care systems Inherited from the socialist era to recuperate and survive. The WHO programme has helped avert major epidemics, prevented scurvy and rickets and helped people to survive the cold of the winter.
T he first shots of the civil war in Yugoslavia were fired in Slovenia on 27 June 1991 the night following Slovenia's proclamation of independence from the socialist federal republic of Yugoslavia. The fighting only lasted 10 days and Slovenia escaped from it almost unscathed, but the next victims were not so lucky. The following month, skirmishes between secessionist Croats and minority Serbs in neighbouring Croatia detonated into full-scale war. The results were ruinous -9,000 dead, 26,000 wounded and 17 hospitals partially or totally destroyed. But worse was yet to come for the region. Most residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina simply did not believe the ethnic war in Croatia could spread to their republic While strong nationalistic feelings always ran just below the surface of unity in former Yugoslavia, Bosnia had a more federalist and cosmopolitan orientation. People, including the Muslim majority, were rather secular. Intermarriage among ethnic groups was common. Only a small part of the population was old enough to remember the atrocities committed during the Second World War. All these factors seemed to make Bosnia immune to ethnic and nationalistic strife. But it was not. In April 1992, it too exploded into war, a war now estimated to have killed as many as 200,000 people, wounded hundreds of thousands more and driven some 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REACTS
The European Community was the first major institution to react to the spiralling political crisis. Just 2 weeks after trouble began in Slovenia, it signed an agreement establishing the European Community Monitoring Mission. The UN Security Council soon followed suit. In September 1991 it passed a resolution expressing deep concern at die fighting and calling upon all states to implement a complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. It was the first in a long series of UN resolutions on former Yugoslavia, many of which have been ignored or are otherwise toothless.
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It soon became clear that the most valuable contribution the UN could make in die region would be a peacekeeping operation and in February 1992 the Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The council intended the force to be an interim body that would create the necessary conditions in which to negotiate an overall settlement of the crisis, but by the time of the Dayton peace accord UNPROFOR had become an enduring feature in the former Yugoslavia. More than 30 countries have contributed over 40,000 troops and 5,000 civilians to die mission (October 1995, UNPROFOR, Office of the Spokesman).
International humanitarian agencies responded almost as quickly. In November 1991, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) began providing the 500,000 refugees and displaced persons generated by the war in Croatia with food and shelter. The outbreak of fighting in Bosnia saw a radical increase in the number of refugees and displaced, which peaked at nearly 4 million for die entire region by late 1994 and has receded only slightly since then. The aid mission grew correspondingly to meet the challenge. The UN seeks donor funding for its humanitarian assistance efforts through regular interagency appeals. In August 1992, the first UN Inter-Agency Mission determined that more than 2.7 million people were directly affected by the war and in need of assistance, including food, shelter and health care. The total requirements at the time were calculated at more than US$ 1 billion, with almost half urgently required to address life-threatening needs. 3 The level of assistance has since decreased as some refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes and a successful seed programme has regenerated local food production in many war-torn areas. In addition to a large family of UN agencies (UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF, WFP, FAO and UNESCO), the European Union and some 250 governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have provided humanitarian assistance to the former Yugoslavia.
ENTER THE WHO In June 1992, the former Chief Medical Officer of the United Kingdom got an urgent phone call from WHO'S Regional Office for Europe asking him to go to the former Yugoslavia. The task was to give public health advice to UNHCR and to help coordinate the work of non-governmental agencies, particularly in the distribution of medical supplies. 4 This was the beginning of an operation that has grown to become the largest humanitarian assistance programme in the WHO'S history, with an annual budget exceeding US$ 30 million and, at the rime the programme was most extensive, 120 staff members working in 8 offices throughout the region.
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The WHO did not arrive on the scene until almost 6 months after die UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP had already established their offices, a fact which made national healdi authorities and some IGOs and NGOs in the region rather unhappy. The main reason for the delay was the novelty of the situation. Until diat time, the WHO'S Regional Office for Europe had simply had no comparable experience in emergency work to bring to bear on the problem. It had implemented humanitarian assistance programmes for the victims of earthquakes in Turkey and Armenia, but the scale and nature of the crises in former Yugoslavia was altogedier different The WHO member states and its professional staff were at first hesitant to get involved in such a large-scale enterprise. Did the WHO have a mandate for it? Had the organization die manpower, skills and infrastructure, die flexibility and speed needed to tackle such a complex disaster widi such serious political ramifications?
Resources were anodier problem. The WHO's regular 9 budget contained no allocation for such a programme, nor was there any certainty of attracting voluntary donations. Many were afraid diat a programme of such size would inevitably spread die organization's resources too dun, resources diat were sorely needed -by die former socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe to help them to reform dieir healdi care systems. An operation in die former Yugoslavia might put those activities at grave risk. But die humanitarian mandate was clear, as millions of people in die midst of Europe were by dien directly affected by die war. The organizational mandate was also clear. The WHO's constitution invites die WHO to act as the 'directing and coordinating audiority' of international health work and also requests die agency to furnish 'technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid' upon die request or acceptance of governments.
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So despite many doubts, the Regional Office for Europe launched a humanitarian assistance programme in former Yugoslavia in the late summer of 1992, with a two-fold objective: to protect the healdi of die population in die region during the conflicts and to prepare national health services for post-war development.
THE WHO'S PROGRAMME From initially providing public health advice and coordination die WHO's humanitarian assistance programme for die former Yugoslavia has grown to encompass 4 major projects: public health, rehabilitation, medical supplies and health care reform. All activities are based on established WHO policies.
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Neutrality The WHO's programme covers all republics of die former Yugoslavia except Slovenia, which has not asked for help. Widiin die operations area, the WHO helps all sides according to need.
Equitable coverage
Contrary to many other humanitarian agencies, die WHO does not distinguish between die local population and refugees. All users of healdi services are eligible beneficiaries of die WHO aid, a position which is easy to justify. Most refugees and displaced persons stay widi local families rather dian in collective centres, making it almost impossible to create a system benefiting only refugees and die displaced. An exclusive focus on refugees would also increase tension between them and the local population.
Public health orientation
The WHO's basic task is to provide technical and normative support in public healdvrelated issues rather than to carry out operational 'hands-on' activities.
Population orientation
Many NGOs help individual patients or specific patient groups. As an intergovernmental and public health organization, die WHO works with local healdi audiorities and die official health care system in order to help population groups and institutions.
The WHO feels that with its limited resources, the agency can do the greatest good for the greatest numbers of people by supporting primary and secondary care institutions to meet basic needs, rather than supporting specialized tertiary care institutions.
Strengthening of local capabilities
All WHO programmes have a training component, the goal being to produce a critical mass of people with the skills to introduce and sustain new preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic and managerial approaches and techniques.
PUBLIC HEALTH The WHO's public health programme follows a simple model: identify a problem by means of health and nutrition monitoring, assess what is needed to solve it and carry out the requisite public health intervention. The early work of the WHO's health monitoring unit is described by Healing et al. The focus has shifted from the collection of primary data to identify problems towards helping existing public health institutions at the national, regional and local levels to analyse and interpret the data which they collect. The WHO also helps its local staff members to improve their epidemiological skills and supplies local institutions with computers and other tools.
The WHO has made a number of direct public health interventions in the former Yugoslavia. The agency has provided materials for delousing refugees and displaced persons in order to control die spread of scabies and prevent typhus, an endemic disease in Bosnia. Winter survival guidelines have been disseminated to help the residents of Sarajevo and odier besieged cities stay alive during the winter months in houses widiout sealed windows and fuel. The WHO has provided rodenticides and pesticides to control die fast-growing population of rats and mice, a major public health problem in many urban areas and a new tuberculosis treatment protocol was introduced to modernize local treatment practices and curb possible increases in the incidence rate of the disease. During that first terrible winter of war in Bosnia, diere was great concern in the outside world that thousands of people might actually die of hunger. To provide early warning of developing problems as well as an empirical basis for action, the WHO launched a systematic nutrition monitoring programme in several besieged cities of the country. The agency measured the nutritional status of the population at regular intervals using simple scientific methods. The population generally lost weight during the first 2 years of the conflict (in Sarajevo, an average of 12 kg in the 1992-1993 winter) and there was some malnutrition, particularly among elderly people who lived alone. However, serious hunger was for the most part prevented, and the large-scale deaths feared did not materialize. Many rehabilitation patients are refugees or displaced persons who have no place to go after completing their primary treatment. As a result, the average length of stay in institutions has increased to the extent that clinics have become permanent homes to many patients. Aggression, apathy, self-destructive behaviour and substance abuse are common. Even for patients who have a place to go, the social environment is not handicap-friendly and diere is virtually no tradition of community-based rehabilitation services. The WHO has supported the development of national rehabilitation policies which ensure a continuum of care from the primary treatment of lesions through institutional care to community-based rehabilitation. Orientation courses have also been given for social planners and architects to sensitize diem to die needs of die handicapped.
Psychosodal rehabilitation
The focus of the WHO'S psychosocial rehabilitation programme is to help the health care system help people with PTSD. This it does primarily by conducting special training for local mental and primary health care personnel to diagnose and treat the problem of PTSD. The programme also attempts to 'care for the caretakers' by providing psychological and psychiatric support and help to humanitarian aid workers suffering from excessive stress and burn-out symptoms. 1 The problem grew more acute as the war dragged on and eventually led the WHO to begin a spare parts project. A biomedical engineer performed a thorough analysis of the need for spare parts in 7 major hospitals in Bosnia, which die WHO addressed by making a special appeal to donors. 15 The agency has also supplied spare parts to facilities in Serbia and Montenegro, where UN sanctions have rendered the maintenance of hospital equipment extremely difficult.
MEDICAL SUPPLIES When the mission in the former
The WHO is only one of a number of agencies supplying drugs to the region. Sarajevo in particular got many private donations, but the quality of these donations was often suspect. The WHO estimated diat as much as 35% of donated medicines were either useless (irrelevant to needs) or downright harmful (expired or containing obscure ingredients). Such donations take up precious air 1 cargo space and require precious fuel to be destroyed. To help donors spend their money in the best way possible, die WHO issued donor guidelines which have since been adapted for use in other emergencies as well.
l6 The WHO also issued guidelines for visiting specialists, who came prepared to do good but sometimes did harm because of their total ignorance of local realities.
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Before die war, all the republics of the former Yugoslavia had access to a broad array of drugs. Doctors tended to be 'prescription-happy' and overprescribing of drugs was rampant. Even in die midst of die war diey could complain that the international aid had not enabled diem to stick to dieir old prescription habits. Fortunately, the local health authorities have slowly realized that it is simply impossible to afford such habits any longer. The WHO has tried to turn necessity into virtue by introducing die idea of an essential drug list and by supporting die development of rational drug policies. In Bosnia, die authorities first proposed a list consisting of some 1,200 drugs which, with the WHO'S advice, they have gradually scaled down to less dian 130.
HEALTH CARE REFORM
The former Yugoslavia had a comprehensive healdi care system widi universal access and reasonably high quality. However, the system was very top-heavy, diat is, hospital-, physician-and drug-oriented. Cost-efficiency was poor. Inflation and high unemployment were undermining die system's economic basis even before die war. The domestic drug industry lost a major market for its products when socialism crumpled in die Central and Eastern European countries. The war has gready aggravated die situation. For example, die drug industry had a clear division of labour and production among die various republics of die former Yugoslavia. Widi die war, drug companies experienced a double loss -large portions of dieir market and access to raw materials. The war drained resources from health care and in parts of Croatia and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina destroyed die physical infrastructure. In die other republics, die physical infrastructure is intact but die need to provide health care for thousands of refugees and displaced persons puts a tremendous strain on the systems. Even before die wars began, the republics realized diat die old system was no longer tenable. 19 Whedier diis prevented a single case of typhus will never be known, but had diere been an outireak of typhus and die WHO not done anydiing to prevent it, die world would have been unforgiving. One can certainly assume diat die implementation of the WHO's winter survival guidelines saved people from dying of hypodiermia. We can also assume diat die WHO's advice to enrich die aid food basket widi micronutrients probably prevented outbreaks of scurvy and rickets. In die area of rehabilitation, die results are clearer. Nearly 1,400 amputees are able to walk today dianks to die WHO's programme and even more will benefit from the skills which die WHO helped local prosdietic technicians to acquire. Croatia is already in die process of designing handicap-friendly buildings and residences. The city of Tuzla in central Bosnia had already started an ambitious new policy for building a handicapped-friendly society during die war.
Before the WHO inaugurated its mental healdi programme, few professionals even knew what PTSD was or how to recognize it, much less how to treat it. Now, scores of psychologists and psychiatrists are being trained in PTSD dierapy each mondi and official awareness about the nature and scale of die problem has increased dramatically. In die summer of 1994, die WHO took a bold step by becoming the first UN agency to invite a group of outside experts, all widi extensive experience in emergency relief operations, to evaluate the effectiveness of its programme in die former Yugoslavia. While die group found reasons for criticism, they concluded their report by saying: This programme has been highly successful in spite of its shortcomings [primarily WHO's somewhat bureaucratic rules and procedures that sometimes slowed down the operations and rendered diem less flexible than desirable]. Even if none of die observed shortcomings were corrected before die next call for humanitarian action, this programme is well worth repeating.
The WHCt humanitarian assistance would not have been possible without the courageous work of the local waff particularly in the field offlca in Bosnia (Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica and Tinla) but also in area and field offices in Croatia (Zagreb and Split, and later Metkovic), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade) and rhe Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Skopje). 
